Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 15
Issue 3 Summer 2006

Article 1

Gonzales v. Raich; Federalism as a Casualty of the
War on Drugs
Ilya Somin

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Somin, Ilya (2006) "Gonzales v. Raich; Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 15:
Iss. 3, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol15/iss3/1

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

GONZALES V. RAICH: FEDERALISM AS A
CASUALTY OF THE WAR ON DRUGS
Ilya Somin t

INTRODUCTION .............................................
I.

AN OVERDOSE OF FEDERAL POWER: RAICH'S
IMPACT ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
CONGRESSIONAL COMMERCE CLAUSE
AUTHORITY ..........................................
A. THE LOPEZ-MORRISON FRAMEWORK .................
B. ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: RAICH'S SWEEPING

511
511

C. THE "BROADER REGULATORY SCHEME" EXCEPTION ....
D. THE RETURN OF THE "RATIONAL BASIS" TEST .........
E. POST-RAiCH DEVELOPMENTS .........................
1. Gonzales v. Oregon ............................
2. Rapanos v. Army Corps of Engineers ...........

513
516
518
519
519
521

F.

POST-RAICH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LOWER COURTS ..

523

G. SUMMING UP RAICH'S IMPACT ........................
TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND PRECEDENT IN RAICH...

525
526

DEFINITION OF "ECONOMIC"

II.

508

A.

ACTIVITY ................

THE TEXTUAL CASE AGAINST RAICH'S READING OF
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ..............................

B.

526

JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE NECESSARY AND PROPER

CLAUSE .............................................. 529

1.
2.
3.
C.

III.

Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence ..............
The textualist case against Justice Scalia's
position........................................
The relevance of McCulloch v. Maryland ........

RAICH AND PRECEDENT ..............................

1. Raich and the myth of Gibbons v. Ogden ........
2. Wickard v. Filburn .............................
MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE POLITICS OF
FEDERALISM .........................................
A. RAICH AND THE BENEFITS OF FEDERALISM ...........

529
531
533
534
534
536
539
540

t Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; B.A., Amberst
College, 1995; J.D., Yale Law School, 2001; M.A. Harvard University Department of Government, 1997; Ph.D. expected. For helpful suggestions and comments, I would like to thank
Neslon Lund, Trevor Morrison, Bill Otis, and participants in the 2005 Cornell Journal of Low
and Public Policy Symposium on the War on Drugs. Amanda Hine served as an invaluable
research assistant.

508

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 15:507

1. Responsiveness to diverse regionalpreferences . 540
2. Interstate competition, mobility, and "voting with
your feet...................................... 541
3. The possibility of spillover effects ............... 542
C. FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL REALISM ...............
543
D. RAICH, FEDERALISM, AND THE POLITICAL LEFT .......
545
IV. THE PROHIBITION PARALLEL ...................... 547
CONCLUSION ................................................ 550
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Raich' marks a
watershed moment in the development of judicial federalism. If it has not
quite put an end to the Rehnquist Court's "federalism revolution," it certainly represents an important step in that direction. In this Article, I contend that Raich represents a major - possibly even terminal - setback for
efforts to impose meaningful judicial constraints on Congress' Commerce Clause powers. I also argue that the Raich decision is misguided
on both textual and structural grounds. The text of the Constitution does
not support the nearly unlimited congressional power endorsed in Raich.
Such unlimited power undercuts some of the major structural advantages
of federalism, including diversity, the ability to "vote with your feet,"
and interstate competition for residents. At the same time, the future
prospects of judicial federalism may depend not just on the precise doctrinal reasoning of Raich, but on the possibility that liberal jurists and
political activists may come to recognize that they have an interest in
limiting congressional power. A cross-ideological coalition for judicial
enforcement of federalism would be far more formidable than today's
narrow alliance between some conservatives and libertarians. Ironically,
the Raich decision, in combination with other recent developments, may
help bring about such a result.
Raich upheld the application of the Controlled Substances Act
("CSA") forbidding the nonprofit use of homegrown marijuana for medical purposes specifically allowed by state law. It represents the broadest
assertion of congressional power to "regulate commerce... among the
2
several States" yet upheld by the Court.
Part I explains how Raich largely eviscerates the modest steps towards limiting congressional Commerce Clause authority that the Court
took in United States v. Lopez 3 and Morrison v. United States. 4 First,
Raich adopts a definition of "economic" that is almost limitless, thereby

1 125

S.Ct. 2195 (2005).

2 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
4 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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ensuring that virtually any activity, can be "aggregated" to produce the
"substantial affect [on] interstate commerce" required to legitimate congressional regulation under Lopez and Morrison.5 Second, Raich makes
it easier for Congress to impose controls on even "noneconomic" activity
by claiming that it is part of a broader "regulatory scheme;"'6 here, the
Court builds on Lopez's statement that Congress can regulate
noneconomic activity if it is an "essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity." 7 But the Raich Court basically ignores the Lopez requirement that the regulation of the noneconomic activity must be an
"essential" part of a "regulatory scheme" intended to control interstate
"economic activity." 8
Finally, Raich reasserts the so-called "rational basis" test, holding
that "[w]e need not determine whether [defendants'] activities, taken in
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding." 9 This holding suggests that even in the rare case where an activity is considered
"noneconomic" under Raich's expansive definition of economic activity,
the regulation is not part of a broader regulatory scheme, and there is no
real substantial effect on interstate commerce, congressional regulation
will likely still be upheld if Congress could "rationally" conclude that
such an effect exists. Taken in combination, these three elements of
Raich place nearly insurmountable obstacles in the path of efforts to ensure meaningful judicial review of congressional exercise of the Commerce Clause power. Future attempts to limit that power are unlikely to
succeed unless the Court can be persuaded to overrule Raich or at least
limit its reach. Unfortunately, this conclusion is not altered by the
Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Oregon,1 0 which interpreted the
CSA in a way that precludes a federal ban on the use of certain drugs to
facilitate physician assisted suicide. The even more recent case of Rapa1
nos v. Army Corps of Engineers"
also leaves Raich very much intact.
Part II explains why Raich was wrongly decided on the basis of
text, structure, and precedent. The word "commerce" should not be interpreted to mean "anything that might potentially affect commerce." Moreover, it is a mistake to read the text of the Commerce Clause to create
virtually unlimited congressional power, as such a reading would render
5 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-559; see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
6 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2208-10.
7 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. This language is quoted in Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2210. However, the Court does not engage in any discussion of the implications of the word "essential"
and seems to assume that it is of no significance.
8 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
9 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2208.
10 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006).
11 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).

510

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 15:507

most of the rest of Congress' Article I powers completely superfluous.
Indeed, reading the Interstate Commerce Clause as broadly as the Raich
Court may even render superfluous the Indian Commerce Clause and the
Foreign Commerce Clause, both of which are found in the very same
sentence as Congress' power to regulate "commerce ...among the several States."' 12 Similar weaknesses bedevil Justice Scalia's effort, in his
concurring opinion, to justify Raich on the basis of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. 13
Precedent also does not justify Raich or at the very least does not
compel it. The 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 14 often used to justify an
expansive commerce power, in fact relies on a very narrow definition of
interstate commerce. Even Wickard v. Filburn, the famous 1942 case that
upheld federal regulation of home-grown wheat,' 5 is distinguishable
from Raich.
Part HI briefly explains why Raich undermines some of the major
political and economic benefits of decentralized federalism. A federalist
policy of allowing states to go their own way on the issue of medical
marijuana would capture the advantages of diversity, "voting with one's
feet," and interstate competition for residents that justify having a federalist system in the first place. Although it would be impractical and undesirable for the Court to try to maximize these benefits by fully
eliminating all departures from the text of the Commerce Clause, that
fact does not provide a justification for judicial abdication. Indeed, the
political underpinnings for a revival of judicial federalism may already
be emerging in the form of newfound interest in limitations on federal
power on the part of many liberals. If such liberal jurists join with conservatives and libertarians in an effort to restore judicial review of Congressional Commerce Clause authority, Raich may not turn out to be the
death knell of judicial federalism after all.
Finally, Part IV explores some interesting parallels between Raich
and the undercutting of federalism by Prohibition in the 1920s. In both
periods, the establishment of a nationwide prohibition regime greatly
eroded decentralized federalism, in part because the Supreme Court accepted the government's claims that the power to regulate a market in
prohibited substances necessarily required comprehensive regulation of
virtually all sale or possession of the commodities in question. The political appeal of this argument and its ability to prevail in two widely divergent historical periods suggests that it may be difficult to combine
meaningful judicial review of federalism with a large-scale prohibition
12 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, CI. 3.
13 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14 22 U.S. (9Wheat.) 1 (1824).
15 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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regime. Conservatives committed to both judicial federalism and an aggressive federal government war on drugs may find it impossible have
their cake and eat it too. The Prohibition experience also lends additional
support to some of the other claims defended in this Article.
I.

AN OVERDOSE OF FEDERAL POWER: RAICH'S IMPACT ON
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL
COMMERCE CLAUSE AUTHORITY

As several commentators have argued, Raich greatly restricts and
perhaps almost completely eliminates the possibility of meaningful judicial limitation of Congress' Commerce Clause powers.' 6 It does so in
three separate ways: by expanding the definition of "economic activity;"
by making it easier to regulate even "noneconomic" activity as part of a
broader regulatory scheme; and by reviving the highly deferential "rational basis" test for evaluating claims of congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause. While some scholars still hold out hope that
17
meaningful Commerce Clause review can continue even after Raich,
the combination of these three moves probably renders such hopes illusory unless and until the Court sees fit to either overrule or significantly
constrain Raich.
A.

THE LOPEZ-MORRISON FRAMEWORK

In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court majority faced the difficult task of attempting to impose some meaningful limits on Commerce
Clause power without launching a frontal attack on post-New Deal
precedents that underpin the modem administrative state. The Court outlined three areas of congressional power under the Commerce Clause:
1. Regulation of "the use of the channels of interstate
commerce."
2. "Regulat[ion] and protect[ion] [of] the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities."
16 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law)
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 753-54 (2005) (contending that Raich effectively
repudiates Lopez and Morrison); see generally Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning,
What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915 (2005) (same).
17 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Foreword:Limiting Raich, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 743
(2005) [hereinafter Limiting Raich] (The article's author represented Respondents Raich and
Monson in Raich.); see also George D. Brown, Counterrevolution?National Criminal Law
after Raich, 66 OHIO ST. U. L.J. 947, 974-82 (2005) (arguing that Raich merely refuses to
extend Lopez and Morrison rather than cutting back on them).
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"[R]egulat[ion] [of] . . . those activities that sub8
stantially affect interstate commerce."'

The most expansive category - and the only one at issue in Lopez,
Morrison, and Raich - is the third: congressional power over activities
that "substantially affect interstate commerce." In order to somehow constrain this category, the majority limited the government's ability to use
"aggregation" analysis in claiming that virtually any activity that affects
interstate commerce is fair game if its impact is analyzed in conjunction
with that of other similar actions. Lopez attempted to cabin the aggregation principle by focusing on the noncommercial aspects of the activity
regulated by the Gun Free School Zones Act (GSFZA): possession of a
gun in a school zone. Such gun possession had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might
define those terms."' 19 Therefore, the Court held, aggregation analysis
could not be applied to it because any such application would inevitably
lead to such a broad interpretation of federal power that the Court would
be "hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
'20
without power to regulate."
The Morrison decision went farther than Lopez in suggesting that
''noneconomic" activity cannot be subjected to aggregation analysis.
Morrison struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act
that created a federal criminal cause of action for victims of gender-motivated violent crimes. Despite considerable evidence mustered by Congress and the dissenting justices indicating that violence against women
had a substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce, 2' the majority
refused to accept this as an adequate ground for federal regulation under
the aggregation principle.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court emphasized its "reject[ion]" of "the argument that Congress may regulate, noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce." '22 While the Court indicated that it "need not
adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases," 23 it emphasized
that previous Supreme Court cases had only used aggregation to uphold
"regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in
18 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; see also, Morrison, 559 U.S. at 609.
19 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
20 Id. at 564.
21 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-29 (Souter, J. dissenting) (describing the "mountain of
data assembled by Congress ... showing the effects of violence against women on interstate
commerce").
22 Id. at 617.
23 Id. at 613.
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nature."'24 At the very least, Morrison and Lopez stand for the proposition
that the use of aggregation to justify regulation of "noneconomic" activity is strongly disfavored, even if it is not categorically forbidden.
Unfortunately, however, the Court failed to provide any formal definition of "economic activity," relying instead on an intuitive understanding of the concept. This ambiguity left the door open for future decisions
to define the term more broadly than the Lopez-Morrison majority had
intended. A second key ambiguity arose from the Lopez Court's recognition that regulation of intrastate noneconomic activity might be permissible if doing so were an "essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated. ' 25 The use of the word "essential"
strongly suggests that the connection between regulation of noneconomic
activity and the "larger regulation of economic activity" must be at least
somewhat substantial; otherwise, Congress could regulate almost any
noneconomic activity simply by claiming a connection, however remote,
to a broader regulatory scheme. However, since the Lopez and Morrison
decisions both addressed facial challenges to "stand alone" statutes,
neither majority opinion attempted to delineate how strong a connection
to a broader regulatory scheme was necessary to uphold a regulation of
intrastate economic activity that otherwise would fall outside the scope
of congressional power.
Finally, Lopez and Morrison failed to clarify the fate of the highly
deferential "rational basis" test, which had been used in some previous
Commerce Clause cases as the standard for evaluating government
26
claims that a given activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
Thus, Lopez and Morrison left at least two major ambiguities that could
be exploited by opponents of the New Federalism. The Raich majority
would take full advantage of both.
B.

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM:
"ECONOMIC" ACTIVITY

RAICH'S SWEEPING DEFINITION OF

The Raich Court's most obvious innovation was its adoption of an
extraordinarily broad definition of "economics," taken from a 1966 Web24 Id.

25 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (quoted in Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2210). However, the Court does
not engage in any discussion of the implications of the word "essential" and seems to assume
that it is unimportant.
26 See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., et al.,
452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) ("The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such finding."); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-304 ("[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the
facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme
necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.").
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ster's dictionary: "refers to 'the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.' "27 As Justice Thomas points out in his dissent, the
majority ignores the fact that "[o]ther dictionaries do not define the term
'economic' as broadly as the majority does," and questions the "select[ion of] a remarkably expansive 40-year-old definition. '28 The majority does not even attempt to explain why the 1966 Webster's definition
should be preferred over other alternatives.
Regardless of the merits of this definition, it is indeed, as Justice
Thomas writes, "remarkably expansive." Almost any human activity involves the "distribution" or "consumption" of a commodity, if not its
production. Having dinner at home surely involves the "consumption" of
a commodity - food. Similarly, giving a birthday present to a friend
surely involves the "distribution" of a commodity. Any such activity
involving production, consumption or distribution can now be regulated
by Congress so long as its aggregate effect has a "substantial" impact on
interstate commerce; and it is hard to deny that the aggregate impact of
eating and gift-giving on interstate commerce is indeed substantial.
Some scholars contend that there is still a significant range of activities excluded from the Court's definition of "economic." For example,
Randy Barnett, the prominent law professor who represented Angel
Raich and co-respondent Diane Munson, writes that "reading a book"
29
and "having sex" are activities that fall outside the definition's scope.
However, reading a book surely involves the consumption of a commodity in so far as books are commercially produced and sold and reading is
their intended consumer use. 30 As for "having sex," it definitely involves
the "consumption" of a commodity in any instance where one or both
participants use birth control devices (commercially produced products
that are "consumed" in the act of having protected sex). Even if the participants in the sexual act dispense with protection, a court applying
Raich could easily conclude that sex itself is a "commodity" in the economic sense of the term. After all, prostitution and pornography are major industries and noncommercial, consensual sex is (in part) a substitute
for the products of these industries. In the same way, the Raich Court
relies heavily on the fact that noncommercial home production of marijuana is a substitute for marijuana produced for sale on the illegal drug
3
market. '
27 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).

28 Id. at 2236 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
29 Barnett, Limiting Raich, supra note 17, at 749.
30 Moreover, repeated reading may literally "consume" a book by weakening its binding
and other wear and tear.
31 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2206-08.
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Professor Barnett is, perhaps, on firmer ground in suggesting that
"most violent crimes, such as the one at issue in Morrison," might not
count as production, distribution, or consumption of commodities. 32
Even here, however, it is difficult to be sure. Murder, for example, might
be considered a substitute for hiring a professional hitman; even rape
(the crime at issue in Morrison) might be viewed as a means by which
criminals "steal" the "commodity" of sex. 33 Analyzing rape as a "theft"
of the "commodity" of sex should not be allowed to obscure or mitigate
the horror of the crime. In any event, the point here is not to condone the
analogy, but to show how it could enable a court to bring rape within the
scope of Raich's definition of "economic activity."
Even more obviously, theft and other crimes involving efforts to
illegally acquire property will surely be considered "economic activity"
under the Court's definition. For example, Raich will likely put an end
to constitutional challenges to applications of the Hobbs Act, a federal
statute that has been used to prosecute small-scale shoplifters on the
ground that their crimes have a substantial aggregate impact on interstate
commerce. 34 Even small-scale theft surely involves the "distribution" of
commodities and sometimes their "consumption" as well. While Barnett
may well be right to suppose that at least some activities fall outside the
of the Court's broad definition of "economic," such examples are likely
to be few and far between.
Raich's breathtakingly broad definition of "economic activity" undercuts any argument to the effect that the decision is consistent with
Lopez and Morrison because it retains the tripartite framework of analysis and the economic-noneconomic distinction. 35 Under such a broad definition, it is arguable that even the actions at issue in Lopez and Morrison
would themselves qualify as "economic." For example, carrying a gun in
a school zone might well be considered "distribution" of a commodity,
and possibly "consumption" as well. Indeed, Alfonso Lopez was paid
$40 to carry his gun in a school zone for the purpose of transferring it to
a member of a drug gang who probably intended to use it to defend the
Barnett, Limiting Raich, supra note 17, at 749.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 182-83 (1992) (using tools of economic
theory to analyze rape as "sex theft").
34 See, e.g., United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (upholding, on an equally divided en banc vote, the conviction of a local shoplifter who had been
sentenced to 97 years in federal prison under the Hobbs Act, for robberies at four local liquor
stores in which he stole a total of about $2300); But cf. United States v. Jimenez-Torres, 435
F.3d 3, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2006) (Torruella, J., concurring) (suggesting that some Hobbs Act
prosecutions are unconstitutional even after Raich). For an analysis of the McFarlandcase, see
Kelly D. Miller, The Hobbs Act, The Interstate Commerce Clause, and United States v. McFarland: The IrrationalAggregation of Independent Local Robberies to Sustain Federal Convictions, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1761 (2002).
35 See Brown, supra note 17, at 979-86.
32
33
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group's commercial interests in a "gang war."' 36 Not all gun possession
near school zones has such obviously economic motives. But under
Raich's broader regulatory scheme analysis, the government could easily
argue that a ban on all possession in school zones is a rational way to
reach those cases where such possession does have a commercial component or motive.
C.

THE "BROADER

REGULATORY SCHEME" EXCEPTION

As we have seen, the Lopez Court permitted congressional regulation of even "noneconomic" intrastate activity in cases where it is an
"essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity [is]
regulated. '37 Raich pushes this exception as far as possible, holding that
the CSA can be used to ban intrastate consumption of homegrown medical marijuana permitted by state law because such a ban is necessary to
facilitate the CSA's attempt to suppress the interstate trade in marijuana
grown for sale on the market. 38 As the Court puts it, "[t]he concern
making it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption
in the CSA is the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market
will draw such marijuana into that market."' 39 Moreover, the Court emphasized that neither Congress nor the prosecution in the Raich case was
required to provide "specific" evidence proving that the CSA's broad
regulatory scheme really would be significantly undermined by permitting the use of homegrown marijuana for medical purposes. 40 It thereby
completely ignored Lopez's statement that the broad regulatory scheme
exception applies only in cases where inclusion of the noneconomic economic activity is "essential" to the enforcement of the regulatory framework. 4 1 Indeed, all the government has to show under Raich is that
"Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping
'42
hole in the CSA."

By effectively eliminating the requirement to provide any evidence
that there really is a need to include intrastate noneconomic activity in
the broader scheme, it becomes possible for Congress to shoehorn virtually any regulation of local noneconomic activity by designating it a
36 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), affid, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
37 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (quoted in Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2210). The Raich Court quotes
this language from Lopez but does not engage in any discussion of the implications of the word
"essential" and seems to implicitly assume that it is of no significance.
38 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2208-11.
39 Id. at 2207.
40 Id. at 2208-09.
41 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
42 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2209.
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component of a broad regulatory framework. For example, Congress
could potentially reenact the Gun Free School Zones Act (GFSZA)
struck down in Lopez by labeling it as an amendment to the broader
regulatory scheme of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA). While
defendants could certainly argue that the GFSZA is not really necessary
to make the NCLBA effective, the kind of evidence cited in Justice
Breyer's Lopez dissent 4 3 would surely be enough to prove that "Congress
had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate [gun possession
in school zones] would leave a gaping hole in the [NCLBA]."44 And
even though Lopez did indicate that the broader regulatory scheme that
justifies the regulation of noneconomic activity must itself be aimed at
activity that is "economic" in nature, 45 education would surely fall within
46
Raich's ultra-expansive definition of the latter.
Professor Anne Althouse contends that Raich's broader scheme exception is nonetheless constrained by the fact that often there may be
"insufficient support for broad-based regulation. '47 For example, at the
time the GFSZA was enacted, there may not have been enough political
support to enact a broad-based federal regulation of gun possession.
Thus, Congress would be forced to forgo some types of regulation because it could not enact them without making politically unpalatable decisions. However, this argument is undercut by the possibility that, under
Raich, Congress would not be required to enact the GFSZA as part of a
new broad regulatory scheme. As pointed out in Justice O'Connor's dissent, the majority opinion "suggests [that] we would readily sustain a
congressional decision to attach the regulation of intrastate activity to a
pre-existing comprehensive (or even not-so-comprehensive) scheme. '48
As the NCLBA example shows, it could enact it as an amendment to a
preexisting scheme that addresses a vaguely related policy issue. Since
Raich has eliminated the Lopez requirement that the regulation of
noneconomic activity must be "essential" to the broader regulatory
scheme, even an extremely vague connection between the original
scheme and the "amendment" is likely to suffice. And there is no reason
to expect the political costs of enacting GFSZA as an amendment to
43 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing extensive evidence
showing that school violence undermines educational performance and that educational performance in turn has extensive effects on interstate commerce).
44 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2209.
45 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
46 See supra § I.B Education quite obviously involves the production, consumption, and
distribution of commodities in many different ways.
47 Anne Althouse, Why Not Heighten the Scrutiny of Congressional Power When States
Undertake Policy Experiments? 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 779, 789 (2005).
48 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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NCLBA to be any greater than that of enacting it as a "single-issue
49
statute."
As several scholars have emphasized, Raich's expansion of the
broader regulatory scheme exception makes it almost impossible for "as
50
applied" Commerce Clause challenges to federal power to succeed.
Virtually any new "stand alone" statute could easily be connected with a
broader regulatory framework that would immunize it against challenge.
D.

THE RETURN OF THE "RATIONAL

BASIS" TEST

Prior to Lopez and Morrison, a number of Commerce Clause decisions had held that the government need not actually prove that a regulated activity had a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, but
merely had to show that there was a "rational basis" for such a conclusion. 51 The Lopez and Morrison cases did not explicitly repudiate the
rational basis test, but also conspicuously did not apply it to the statutes
at issue in those decisions. Indeed, in Morrison, the Court struck down
the challenged section of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
despite the fact that the claim of a substantial impact on interstate commerce was "supported by numerous [congressional] findings" that would
almost certainly have been more than enough to pass muster under the
rational basis approach. 52 Although Morrison did not explicitly reject the
rational basis test, the majority's failure to apply the test and their explicit imposition of a considerably higher standard of scrutiny strongly
suggested that, at the very least, rational basis analysis does not apply to
regulations of intrastate, "noneconomic" activity.
However, Morrison and Lopez's failure to explicitly repudiate the
rational basis standard allowed the Raich majority to make use of it without even considering the possibility that it might no longer be applicable
after the former two decisions. Instead, the Raich majority emphasized
that "[w]e need not determine whether [defendants'] activities, taken in
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding. ' 53 This approach
would enable the government to successfully defend almost any regulation. It is difficult to imagine any noteworthy class of activities for which
49 Althouse, supra note 47, at 789.
50 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 16, at 771-76; Reynolds & Denning, supra note 16, at 91618.
51 See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276 ("The court must defer to a congressional finding that
a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding."); McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-304 ("Where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts
and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.").
52 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
53 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2208.
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a reasonably intelligent lawyer cannot come up with some "rational" reason to believe that they might substantially affect interstate commerce if
"taken in the aggregate. '54 The return of the rational basis test casts further doubt on claims that meaningful judicial review of Commerce
Clause cases can survive Raich.
Although there are some fields of law where the Court uses the rational basis test in a way that still preserves meaningful judicial scrutiny
of a statute's rationale, 55 in most areas "rational basis" is a euphemism
for a highly permissive test that almost any rationale can satisfy. The
Raich majority's failure to require the government to present any evidence that homegrown, home-consumed medical marijuana has a significant impact on the interstate drug market indicates that it was applying
the traditional highly permissive version of the test.
E.

POST-RAICH DEVELOPMENTS
56
1. Gonzales v. Oregon

In January 2006, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Gonzales v. Oregon,5 7 a case that some perceive as a partial repudiation
of Raich, or at least as a reassertion of state autonomy.5 8 Oregon rejected
the Bush Administration's attempt to interpret the CSA in a way that
would have permitted it to punish Oregon doctors who use prescription
drugs to facilitate assisted suicide, as they are permitted to do under the
state's Death with Dignity Act.
In reality, however, Oregon does not in any way undercut Raich's
constitutional holding. Both the majority and dissenting justices took
pains to point out that the decision was a purely statutory one and did not
conclude that Congress lacked constitutional authority to forbid assisted
suicide using its powers under the Commerce Clause. The majority opinion emphasized that "there is no question that the Federal Government
can set uniform national standards" for the "regulation of health and
541

d.

See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (using the rational basis test to strike
down a statute that discriminates against gays, despite the fact that the state put forward a
number of rationales for the law that would normally have been enough to pass minimalistic
rational basis scrutiny).
56 For a more detailed analysis of Oregon, on which this Section is based, see Ilya
55

Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism: Clear Statement Rules After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005-

2006 CATO SUp. CT. REV. 113, 123-26 (2006).
57 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006).
58

See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject U.S. Bid to Block Assisted Suicide, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at Al ("While the court's decision was based on standard principles of
administrative law, and not on the Constitution, it was clearly influenced by the majority's

view that the regulation of medical practice belonged, as a general matter, to the states.");
Tony Mauro, Court Sides with Oregon Over Assisted Suicide Law, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23,

2006, at 10 (suggesting that the Court had "sid[ed] with states' rights").
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safety" despite the fact that "these areas" have traditionally been "a matter of local concern."' 59 Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justice Thomas
and Chief Justice Roberts, similarly noted that "using the federal commerce power to prevent assisted suicide is unquestionably permissible"
under the Court's precedents, and that the only question addressed by
Oregon is "not whether Congress can do this, or even whether Congress
60
should do this; but simply whether Congress has done so in the CSA."
The majority did make a small bow to federalism in stating that part
of the basis of its decision was the fact that there was insufficient proof
that in enacting the CSA Congress had "the farreaching intent to alter the
federal-state balance" by overriding the states' traditional power to regulate medicine. 6 ' This holding might lend some support to scholars who
would like to replace substantive judicial review of Commerce Clause
cases with "clear statement" rules that require Congress to plainly indicate its intent in cases where a statute is intended to infringe on a particularly sensitive area of state authority. 62 However, the Oregon Court
specifically disclaimed reliance on any such principle, claiming that "[i]t
is unnecessary even to consider the application of clear statement requirements" because the correct interpretation of the CSA could so easily
be determined through the use of ordinary statutory analysis and
"commonsense." 63
Only Justice Thomas, in a solitary dissent, suggested that there was
a possible tension between the Court's reasoning in Oregon and its recent holding in Raich.64 Whether or not Thomas' argument has merit, it
seems clear that the other eight justices, especially those in the majority,
have done all they could to foreclose the possibility that Oregon could
undercut Raich in any meaningful way.

59 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 923 (quotation omitted).
60 Id. at 939 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61

Id. at 925.

62 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (noting that there already is a
clear statement requirement for cases where Congress enacts a statute that seeks to "alter the
usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government"); SWANCC v.
Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (using this canon to avoid the constitutional
issue in a noteworthy Commerce Clause case); Thomas M. Merrill, Rescuing Federalismafter
Raich: The Casefor Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 823 (2005) (Cf. arguing that the federalism clear statement rule is superior to judicial enforcement of substantive
limits on federal power). Significantly, the Oregon majority did not even mention SWANCC.
63 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 925.

64 Id. at 939-42 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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Rapanos v. Army Corps of Engineers6 5

In June 2006, the Court handed down another federalism-related decision, Rapanos v. Army Corps of Engineers.66 The case involved the
scope of federal authority to regulate "wetlands" under the Clean Water
Act of 1972 ("CWA"), which gives the Army Corps of Engineers the
power to regulate discharges into "navigable waters," 67 a term defined as
encompassing "the waters of the United States. '6 8 Two property owners
claimed that the Corps lacked both statutory and constitutional authority
to regulate land they owned which was 11 to 20 miles away from the
69
nearest navigable water and connected to it only by man-made drains.
In a split 4-1-4 decision, the Court refused to endorse the government's
claim that the CWA gives the Corps the power to regulate virtually any
wet area, regardless of the degree of connection to "navigable" water70
ways, and instead remanded the case for further factfinding.
Some observers hoped and others feared that the Rapanos case
7
might rein in the impact of Raich on judicial review of federalism. '
Such hopes and fears have turned out to be groundless. The Rapanos
majority does not enforce any constitutional limits on federal power. Nor
does it increase the protection for federalism provided by rules of statutory interpretation.
Neither Justice Scalia in his plurality opinion nor Justice Kennedy
address the constitutional issues raised by the property owners. Both rely
exclusively on statutory interpretation arguments about the meaning of
the Clean Water Act.72 They hold that Congress in the CWA didn't give
the Army Corps of Engineers the power to regulate any and all bodies of
water, no matter how small or non-navigable. But that does not mean that
it couldn't do so if it wanted to. Indeed, it is striking that Scalia' s opinion
65 Some of the material in this section is a revised version of a post produced for the
Volokh Conspiracy Blog. See Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://
volokh.com/posts/1150751435.shtml (June 19, 2006, 5:10 p.m.). For a more detailed
discussion of Rapanos, see Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism supra note 56, at 126-30.
66 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).
67 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a) (2000).
68 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2002).
69 126 S.Ct. at 2214, 2219.
70 Id.

71 See, e.g., Sara Beardsley, The End of the Everglades? Supreme Court Case Jeopardizes 90 percent of U.S. Wetlands, 294 Sci. AM. 14, 14-15 (2006) (claiming that Rapanos
might radically reduce federal regulatory authority over wetlands and noting that "federalist
watchdogs cling to Rapanos ... as an opportunity to curb Washington's power").
72 Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. at 2220-25 interpreting CWA reference to "waters of the United
States" to cover only "relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water
forming geographic features that are described in ordinary parlance as streams[,] ... oceans,
rivers, [and] lakes." (citations and quotation marks omitted); id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (interpreting it to require "the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in
question and navigable waters in the traditional sense").
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does not even mention Raich, while Kennedy's does so only briefly, using it to justify interpreting the CWA to give the Corps greater regulatory
73
authority than the plurality would allow.

Rapanos also does little or nothing to limit congressional power
through rules of statutory interpretation. There are two rules of construction that the Rapanos majority could have used to constrain congressional power. The "constitutional avoidance" canon requires courts to
reject interpretations of a statute that "raise serious constitutional
problems" unless there is a clear statement in the law that Congress intended it to be interpreted in that way. 74 The "federalism canon" requires
a similar "unmistakably clear" statement of congressional intent in statutes that "alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and
the Federal Government" 7 5 In the 2001 SWANCC case, the Court relied
on both canons in rejecting the Army Corps of Engineers' "migratory
bird rule," which interpreted the CWA to give the Corps authority to
regulate any isolated non-navigable waters that might be used by migra76
tory birds.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion briefly cites the two canons to buttress its interpretation of the CWA. 77 However, Scalia mostly relies on a
detailed textual analysis of the statute. 78 His opinion does not hold that
either canon would require rejection of the government's interpretation
of the CWA even if the latter were otherwise persuasive. This is a significant omission because previous avoidance canon cases specifically note
that clear statement rules require courts to reject even "an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute" if endorsing it "would raise serious
'79
constitutional problems."
In any event, Scalia's treatment of the canons probably lacks precedential significance and does not bind lower courts because Justice Kennedy specifically rejected it in his concurring opinion. Because Rapanos
is a 5-4 decision, Kennedy's vote was decisive to the result. As Chief
Justice Roberts (who signed on to Scalia's interpretation of the CWA)
points out in his concurring opinion, cases where there is no one opinion
73 Id. at 2250 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2206

(2005)).
74 See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504
(1979) (requiring a clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress' before a statutory
interpretation that raises serious constitutional questions can be accepted).
75 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
76 SWANCC v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
77 Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. at 2224.
78 Id. at 2220-23, 2225-34.
79 DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575.
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endorsed by a majority of the Court are governed by Marks v. United
States.80 According to Marks:
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds. 8'
In this case, Kennedy is almost certainly the justice who concurred
on the "narrowest grounds," since his opinion places fewer restrictions
on the Corps than Scalia's, and also provides a considerably less sweeping and more ambiguous interpretation of the CWA. Thus, Rapanos is
unlikely to expand the application of the two avoidance canons to statutes that rely on Congress' Commerce Clause authority. Indeed, it is possible that Raich might result in a reduction of their applicability, since
the scope of congressional power is now so broad that assertions of fed82
eral power will almost never raise serious constitutional problems.
F.

POST-RAICH DEVELOPMENTS

IN THE LOWER COURTS

Post-Raich Court of Appeals decisions confirm the view that congressional power is now virtually limitless. Five circuit courts have now
held that Raich requires them to uphold a ban on the intrastate possession
of internet images of child pornography, 8 3 reversing a previous trend
under which the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits had held that at least some
such prosecutions fall outside the scope of congressional Commerce
Clause authority.8 4 In United States v. Sullivan, the recent D.C. circuit
case upholding the statute, Judge David Sentelle-a staunch conservative
advocate of constitutional limits on federal power 85-wrote a concurring
opinion where he noted the ways in which the case highlighted tensions
80 See Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).

81 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. at 193.
82 DeBartolo, 468 U.S. at 575.
83 See United States v. Sullivan, 451 F. 3d 884 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2006); United States
v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210 (11 th Cir. 2006) ("Maxwell II"); United States v. Chambers, 441
F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Grimmette, 439 F.3d 1263 (loth Cir. 2006); United
States v. Jeronimo-Batista, 425 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d
73 (4th Cir. 2005).
84 United States v. Maxwell. 385 F.3d 1042 (11 th Cir. 2004), vacated 126 S.Ct. 321
(2005), overruled by Maxwell II, 446 F.3d at 1216; United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114
(9th Cir. 2003).
85 Sentelle is noted for his strong pro-federalism dissent in Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders
v. Babbit, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), where he argued that Congress lacked the power to
forbid the destruction of the habitat of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, an insect with no
known commercial value that is found only in one state. Id. at 1061-67 (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting).
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between Raich and Lopez, and explained that he "would have vote[d] to
reverse appellant's conviction were it not for ... Raich.86 Nonetheless,

Sentelle concedes that "[he] cannot fault the majority's application of the
later decision in Raich.8 7 If even so strong a defender of limits on federal
power is persuaded that Raich permits regulation of activities that probably fall outside the three Lopez categories, 88 it is a safe bet that other
lower court judges will reach the same conclusion.
A recent Tenth Circuit decision is the only lower court case so far
that seems to set some limits on federal power under Raich. In United
States v. Patton, the Tenth Circuit upheld a federal law criminalizing
possession of body armor by convicted felons. 89 In an opinion by Judge
Michael McConnell, the court concluded that possession of body armor
does not fall within Raich's definition of economic activity, which includes the "production, consumption, and distribution" of commodities. 90
Judge McConnell argued that possession of body armor does not constitute "consumption" of a commodity because "[c]onsumption is the 'act
of destroying a thing by using it; the use of a thing in a way that thereby
exhausts it,' Black's Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed.2004), and possessing
or wearing body armor neither destroys nor exhausts it."' 9 1 Possession of
body armor is therefore different from the possession of medical marijuana in Raich, since the latter eventually "exhausts" the drug by using it
for medicinal purposes. 92 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that the body armor statute does not get the benefit of "aggregation" because it does not
regulate economic activity. 93 And it cannot be upheld as regulation of
noneconomic activity because it is not part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 94 In the end, the Tenth Circuit upheld the statute under
Scarborough v. United States, a 1977 statutory interpretation case that
seems to permit federal regulation of a commodity that has previously
95
passed through interstate commerce.
86 Sullivan, 2006 WL 1735889 at *12-13 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
87 Id. at *13.
88 See id. at *l 1-13 (explaining why possession of internet images of child pornography
falls outside the three Lopez categories of federal Commerce Clause authority).
89 United States v. Patton, 2006 WL 1681336 (10th Cir. June 20, 2006).
90 Id. at *7 (citing Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2211).
91 Id.
92

Id.

Id.
94 Id. at *7-8.
95 Id. at *16 (relying on Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977)). The
Tenth Circuit's reliance on Scarborough is dubious, since the case merely assumes that Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate commodities that pass through interstate commerce in order to settle a question of statutory interpretation. It does not actually decide the
constitutional issue itself. See id. at 575-77 (considering only the question of congressional
"intent" in enacting the statute in question, and failing to examine the constitutional issue).
93
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Patton, however, does not really impose meaningful limits on the
scope of post-Raich federal power. Given the ease with which virtually
96
any regulation can be fitted into a "comprehensive regulatory scheme,"
Congress could have easily reenacted the body armor ban had the Tenth
Circuit invalidated it; for example, it could have passed it as an amendment to the Controlled Substances Act. The possibility that felons belonging to drug gangs might acquire body armor and make it more
difficult for the authorities to go after them would almost certainly satisfy the lenient Raich standard. 97 Furthermore, Judge McConnell's distinction between possession and consumption may not be a correct
interpretation of Raich. After all, possession of medical marijuana in and
of itself does not "destroy" or "exhaust" the commodity in question any
more than possession of body armor. To be sure, the purpose of possessing marijuana is to eventually use it, and that does indeed lead to its
destruction or exhaustion. However, the purpose of possessing body armor is also use. And such use can certainly result in the armor being
destroyed or damaged, especially if it fulfills its intended function of
98
stopping bullets.
Ultimately, the goal of possessing any commodity is to use it, or at
least to retain the option of doing so. And such use nearly always has at
least some chance of damaging, "exhausting," or destroying it. In some
cases, of course, we possess objects in order to later sell or give them to
others rather than to use them ourselves. However, even this kind of possession ultimately entails future use, even if by other people. Moreover,
possession for the purpose of transfer surely involves the "distribution"
of a commodity, which also counts as economic activity under Raich.99
G.

SUMMING UP RAICH'S IMPACT

Overall, Raich's evisceration of Lopez and Morrison was in large
part a consequence of ambiguities in those earlier decisions themselves.
The Lopez and Morrison Courts failed to provide a definition of "economic activity," did not precisely delineate the scope of the "broader
regulatory scheme" exception, and refrained from explicitly repudiating
the rational basis test or stating unequivocally that it does not apply to
regulations of "noneconomic" activity. In each of these three areas, there
was some indication that the Court favored constructions that would limit
federal power; otherwise Lopez and especially Morrison could not have
96 See supra § I.C.
97 See discussion in id.
98 For example, the website of one body armor manufacturer notes that "Any attack
against SAP or HAP armour will reduce the 100% effectiveness of the armour, [and] the
damaged panel should be replaced at the earliest opportunity." LBA Int'l Ltd., Body Armour
FAQ, http://www.lbainternational.com/faq.htm#8 (visited June 29, 2006).
99 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2211.
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come out the way they did. But the Court's failure to address these issues
explicitly left gaps in its analysis that Justice Stevens' majority opinion
in Raich exploited to the hilt. As a result, future substantive judicial review of congressional Commerce Clause authority is largely dead in the
water until Raich is either limited or overruled.
II.

TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND PRECEDENT IN RAICH

This Part criticizes the Raich decision primarily on textual and
structural grounds. I also contend that Raich cannot be justified on the
basis of precedent. The textualist arguments presented here should be
distinguished from originalist ones. Even jurists who reject originalism
need not and should not also reject the relevance of text and structure.'0°
It is perfectly possible, at least in many situations, to analyze a text without reference to the intentions of its drafters or the understanding of the
ratifiers. Rejection of textualism, as distinguished from originalism,
would seem to raise the question of why we should have a written Constitution at all. If courts are to decide constitutional cases without being
constrained by the text, it would seem to be more efficient and more
honest to rely directly on whatever philosophical, prudential, or policy
grounds that drive their decisions.
However, I do not attempt here to defend textualism against theories
that argue that judicial decision-making should largely ignore the text in
favor of reliance on prudential political considerations or "common law"
reasoning focusing on policy consequences. 10 1 For present purposes, I
assume, in common with most scholars and jurists, that the constitutional
text should play a major role in judicial review, even if it is not always
the only factor that deserves consideration. I incorporate a number of

prudential and political factors into the analysis in Part III.
A.

THE TEXTUAL CASE AGAINST RAICH'S READING OF THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE

The textual argument against Raich's interpretation of the Com-

merce Clause is sufficiently simple and unoriginal that I hesitate to dwell
on it for too long. Nonetheless, some discussion is necessary in light of
the Raich majority's almost complete neglect of textual considerations. It
should be noted that the textualist argument presented differs from the
Raich dissenters' contention that Congress cannot regulate homegrown
medical marijuana because this class of activities is part of a special class
100 See PHILIP

BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH

25-26 (1982) (explaining why "textualist"

constitutional arguments are distinct from "historical" claims and rest on different premises).
101 See, e.g., TERRI JENNINGS PERRETI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (2000); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)[hereinafter LAW, PRAGMATISM];
David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
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defined by the state's Compassionate Use Act.' 0 2 Under my analysis,
Congress lacks the power to regulate homegrown medical marijuana
even in cases where state law is silent on the subject. The critical issue is
the scope of congressional power, not that of the state.
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."' 1 3 Focusing first on the word "commerce," I have long
noted that nonlawyers and first year law students are almost always surprised at the notion that the Supreme Court has interpreted that word to
give Congress the power to regulate anything that has even a remote
potential effect on commerce; or as the Raich Court puts it, any activity
that, "taken in the aggregate" Congress might have a "rational basis" for
believing "substantially affect[s] interstate commerce."'0 4 In common
usage, the word "commerce" generally refers to the exchange of goods or
services, not to any and all activity that might have an effect on such
05
exchange.
To be sure, some words function as "terms of art" that have specialized meanings in legal parlance that differ from ordinary usage. However, there is no evidence indicating that "commerce" is such a term.
Indeed, in other situations, lawyers seem to use the term in much the
same way as laypeople do. For example, first year law students quickly
learn that the Uniform Commercial Code regulates the exchange of
goods and services through contracts, but does not purport to govern activities such as manufacturing, education, torts, property ownership, and
violent crime, despite the fact that all of these surely have an effect on
commercial exchange. The leading American legal dictionary defines the
term "commerce" as "[t]he exchange of goods, productions or property
of any kind; the buying, selling, or exchanging of articles." 10 6 This legal
definition is very similar to that found in ordinary usage and in general
purpose dictionaries.10 7 And, for those willing to give credence to
originalism, it is worth noting that the modem lay and legal definition of
the term is also very similar to that which prevailed at the time of the
Founding. 108
102

Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

103

U.S.

CONST.,

art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

104 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2208.
105 See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY

176 (pbk. ed. 1984) (defining "com-

merce" as "an interchange of goods").
106 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 285 (8th ed. 2004).
107 See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 176.
108 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588-89 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Randy E. Barnett,
The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 112-25 (2001)
(describing eighteenth century definitions of "commerce")[hereinafter Original Meaning].
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As Justice Thomas effectively argued in his concurrence in Lopez,
expanding our gaze beyond the word "commerce" to consider the Clause
as a whole strengthens the textual case against deriving unlimited congressional power from the Commerce Clause.10 9 In addition to giving
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, the Clause also
gives it the authority to regulate commerce "with foreign Nations" and
"Indian Tribes." 1 0 As Thomas points out, "if Congress could regulate
matters that substantially affect interstate commerce, there would have
been no need to specify that Congress can regulate international trade
and commerce with the Indians."'I There is no doubt that "these other
branches of trade substantially affect interstate commerce." 1 1 2
Thomas also emphasizes that a reading of the Commerce Clause
that gives Congress the power to regulate all activities that might "substantially affect" interstate commerce would render most of Congress'
' 13
other enumerated Article I powers "wholly superfluous:"
[I]f Congress may regulate all matters that substantially
affect commerce, there is no need for the Constitution to
specify that Congress may enact bankruptcy laws,[U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8] cl. 4, or coin money and fix the standard of weights and measures, cl. 5, or punish counterfeiters of United States coin and securities, cl. 6.
Likewise, Congress would not need the separate authority to establish post-offices and post-roads, cl. 7, or to
grant patents and copyrights, cl. 8, or to "punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas," cl. 10. It
might not even need the power to raise and support an
Army and Navy, cls. 12 and 13, for fewer people would
engage in commercial shipping if they thought that a foreign power could expropriate their property with ease. 114
As Thomas recognized, all of these other powers surely involve activities that, especially in the aggregate, have a "substantial affect" on
interstate commerce.' 15 In addition, the same could be said for the power
to "borrow Money on the credit of the United States," ' " 16 the power to
call state militia into federal service to enforce the law and suppress insurrections, 117 and the power of "organizing, arming and disciplining"
'09

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-89.

110 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588-89 (Thomas, J., concurring).
id. at 589.
1'3 Id. at 588.
114 Id.
'I'
112

115 Id.
116 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
'17

Id. at cl. 15.

2006]

GONZALES

V. RAICH

the militia when called into federal service.' 18 After all, borrowing
money surely has a major impact on interstate commerce and commerce
is likely to be seriously disrupted if the federal government lacks the
troops necessary to enforce the law or suppress an insurrection. If the
troops are not organized, armed, and disciplined, that too is likely to have
a major negative effect on commerce. While some overlap is probably
inevitable in any enumeration of legislative authority, a reading of Article I that would render most, if not all,' 19 of Congress' eighteen enumerated powers "wholly superfluous"' 120 is implausible to say the least.
My one quarrel with Thomas' analysis is that he frames it as a demonstration that the substantial effects test is a "depart[ure] from the original understanding." 1 2 1 While this emphasis is understandable coming
from an originalist, it is important to note that even a nonoriginalist
should recognize the force of the argument so long as he or she remains
committed to the importance of constitutional text. As demonstrated
here, a textualist analysis casts serious doubt on Raich's interpretation of
the Commerce Clause even without any reference to original meaning
whatsoever.

B.

JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE

More complex textual issues are raised by Justice Scalia's effort, in
his concurrence in Raich, to justify congressional power over homegrown medical marijuana by means of the Necessary and Proper Clause
rather than the Commerce Clause standing alone. 122 However, Scalia's
formulation is not wholly free of the same sorts of textual weaknesses
that bedevil the majority opinion.
1. Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence
Scalia concedes that the power to regulate "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce [but] are not themselves part of interstate commerce ... cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone."' 123
He argues that such regulations can be sustained on the basis of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which grants Congress the power to "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
118 Id. at cl. 16.

119 In addition to the Commerce Clause itself, probably only the power to establish lower
federal courts (Id. at cl. 9) and the power to exercise "exclusive jurisdiction" over the national
capital (Id. at art. 17), would not be redundant. And even the former might well be superfluous, since the establishment of federal courts could easily have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce by enabling commercial disputes to be resolved through federal litigation.
120 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 585.
122 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 2215-16.
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the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
124
thereof."
According to Scalia, the Necessary and Proper Clause permits regulation of intrastate activity in two situations that are not covered by the
Commerce Clause power alone. First, he contends that it allows regulation of intrastate economic activity that "substantially affects" interstate
commerce. 12 5 However, Scalia argues that this analysis does not apply to
noneconomic activities, including mere possession of guns in a school
zone or mere possession of homegrown medical marijuana. 126 Scalia
contends that the Necessary and Proper Clause does permit regulation of
"even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of
a more general regulation of interstate commerce."' 12 7 On this basis, he
argues that the government's position in Raich must be sustained because
the CSA is a comprehensive attempt to "extinguish the interstate market
in Schedule I controlled substances, including marijuana."' 128 Furthermore, he asserts it is "impossible to distinguish" homegrown medical
marijuana from other types, thereby making it impossible to suppress the
market in recreational marijuana without also banning medical marijuana.1 29 As Scalia puts it, "marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never more than an instant from the interstate
0

market."13

Scalia contends that his approach does not give Congress unlimited
power because "the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of
interstate commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those
measures necessary to make the interstate regulation effective."' 13 Furthermore, quoting Chief Justice Marshall's famous statement in McCulloch v. Maryland, Scalia emphasizes that the means used by Congress
"must be 'appropriate' and 'plainly adapted"' to a legitimate constitutional end, "and must be 'consistent with the letter and spirit of the
32
constitution'." 1

Unfortunately, these strictures are largely undermined by Justice
Scalia's extremely lax standards for determining whether or not a given
regulation of intrastate noneconomic activity really is "necessary to make
124 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c1. 18.

125 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2216.
126 Id. at 2216-17.
127 Id. at 2217.
128 Id. at 2219.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 2218.
132 Id. at 2219 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
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the interstate regulation effective."' 33 In his view, Congress need only
prove that the regulation is "reasonably adapted to the attainment of a
legitimate end under the commerce power."' 134 This Necessary and
Proper Clause test seems very similar to the "rational basis" standard
applied by the majority under the Commerce Clause itself. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that nowhere does Scalia state that the
government is required to present evidence indicating that a ban on
homegrown medical marijuana is actually needed to make the ban on the
interstate market in marijuana effective.
This omission is unlikely to be accidental, since as Justice
O'Connor's dissent shows, "[t]here is simply no evidence that homegrown medical marijuana users constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable
enough class to have a discernable, let alone substantial, impact on the
national illicit drug market."'' 35 The scanty evidence presented by the
government seems unlikely to pass muster under any standard of review
more stringent than the "rational basis" approach adopted by the majority. 136 Failure to require at least some substantial evidence that regulation
of intrastate noneconomic activity really is "necessary" to effectuate the
government's attempt to regulate interstate commerce ensures that
Scalia's approach has the same tendency to legitimate unlimited federal
power as the majority's use of the broader regulatory scheme exception. 137 Justice Scalia's failure to cite any evidence at all or to indicate a
standard of evidence that the government must meet, suggests that his
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause is ultimately just as
deferential to the government as the majority opinion's theory of the
38
Commerce Clause.
2.

The textualist case against Justice Scalia's position

Is Justice Scalia's argument less vulnerable to textualist objection
than the majority's? In one sense, it probably is. Because of its use of the
broad and vague terms "necessary" and "proper," the scope of the clause
relied upon by Scalia is far more difficult to determine through textual
analysis than that of the Commerce Clause, which uses more precise
terms such as "commerce" and "among the several States."'1 39 Indeed,
the wording of the Necessary and Proper Clause is sufficiently imprecise
that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the text alone does not
Id. at 2218.
Id. at 2217 (quotation omitted).
135 Id. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136 See id. at 2228-29 (discussing evidence presented in the case).
137 See supra, § I.C.
138 See Adler, supra note 16, at 767-68 for another scholarly analysis that concludes that
Justice Scalia's approach ultimately leads to the same results as the majority's opinion.
133

134

139

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl.3.
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provide adequate indication of its meaning. Some analysis of external
sources, whether originalist or otherwise, is necessary to define its scope
140
with precision.
One textualist argument against Justice Scalia's interpretation can
still be advanced, however. Like the majority's interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, Scalia's theory of the Necessary and Proper Clause
would render nearly all of Congress' other enumerated Article I powers
superfluous. Under Scalia's theory, the combination of the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause give Congress sufficient
power to regulate any activity that legislators believe may believe they
must reach in to effectuate a scheme of regulation intended to control
interstate commerce. And, as we have seen, the government is not required to provide any evidence demonstrating that Congress' judgment
of necessity is correct.
At the very least, this theory renders Congress' power to regulate
international trade and trade with the Indian tribes superfluous, since it is
easy to claim that a regulation of interstate trade in a given commodity
cannot be fully effective without similar regulation of international and
Indian trade in the same article. Likewise, the power to borrow money,
the power to raise armies, the power to set weights and measures, and
others, could easily be incorporated within the scope of Justice Scalia's
analysis because all of them can be used to control or influence either
interstate commerce itself or activities that affect it.141 In effect, Justice
Scalia's view leads to the conclusion that the combination of the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause renders
nearly all of Congress' other enumerated powers superfluous. This result
is a strong textualist reason to reject Scalia's position.
The textualist argument presented here does not provide a comprehensive theory of the Necessary and Proper Clause and is not intended to
do so. Personally, I am persuaded by the arguments int the articles writ43
ten by Randy Barnett 142 and Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger,1
which use Founding Era sources to show that the original understanding
of the Clause incorporated somewhat restrictive definitions of "necessary" and of "proper," intending to prevent Congress from adopting measures that impinged on federalism and state power. I fully recognize that
other scholars, especially those who reject originalism, might reasonably
adopt a more expansive view of the Necessary and Proper Clause than
140 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003).
141 See discussion supra §II.A.
142 See Barnett, supra note 140, at 183.
143 Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Durra L.J. 267 (1993).
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the one I endorse. The analysis presented here certainly falls well short
of a complete theory of the Clause. I have tried to show only that an
interpretation expansive enough to sanction the Raich decision is vulnerable to the textualist criticism that it renders most of Congress' Article I
powers completely superfluous.
3.

The relevance of McCulloch v. Maryland

Finally, it is worth demonstrating that my conclusions are not inconsistent with Chief Justice Marshall's canonical interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland.144 Although
Marshall famously concluded that the word "necessary" can be interpreted to mean "convenient ... or useful,"' 145 he also emphasized that
legislation adopted by Congress must be for a "legitimate" end, using
means that are "appropriate and plainly adapted to that end" and are
"consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution."' 146 Furthermore,
Marshall notes that,
should congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it would become the painful
duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act was not the
147
law of the land.
Such judicial scrutiny, according to Marshall, need not be nearly as deferential to Congress as Justice Scalia's theory seems to be:
Nor does the rule of interpretation we contend for, sanction any usurpation, on the part of the national government; since, if the argument be, that the implied powers
of the constitution may be assumed and exercised, for
purposes not really connected with the powers specifically granted, under color of some imaginary relation between them, the answer is, that this is nothing more than
arguing from the abuse of constitutional powers, which
would equally apply against the use of those that are
confessedly granted to the national government; that the
danger of the abuse will be checked by the judicial department, which, by comparing the means with the proposed end, will decide, whether the connection is real, or
144 See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
145
146

Id. at 413-14.
Id. at 421.

147 Id. at 423.
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assumed as the pretext for the usurpation of powers not
148
belonging to the government.
Thus, Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause would require courts to scrutinize legislation to ensure that
its connection with Congress' enumerated powers is "real" and not a
mere "imaginary .. .pretext for . . . usurpation."' 14 9 To be sure, Marshall's opinion does not provide much guidance as to how close and
searching judicial scrutiny of the means-ends connection should be. Yet
it is clear that his statements do not preclude vigorous judicial scrutiny of
congressional claims of authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, even if they do not necessarily compel it. Both in McCulloch
itself and in his later writings, Marshall took pains to demonstrate that
his interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause did not grant Con1 50
gress anything approaching unlimited power.
C.

RAICH AND PRECEDENT

The majority opinion in Raich relied heavily on precedent,1 5t especially the Court's 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn.152 In this Section,
I attempt to demonstrate that the outcome of Raich was not compelled by
precedent, as Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court claimed. However, it
should be noted that precedent also does not require the opposite conclusion. Raich was a sufficiently novel case that the Court had enough discretion to decide either way without blatantly going against precedent.
1. Raich and the myth of Gibbons v. Ogden
Although the Raich majority did not engage in any extensive discussion of Gibbons v. Ogden,15 3 this famous 1824 case is so often cited as a
precedent supporting an extremely broad interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that it deserves some brief consideration here.
In Gibbons, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote an opinion for the
Court upholding the constitutionality of a federal law granting navigation
licenses to ships engaged in the "the coasting trade," and forbade the
State of New York to grant a monopoly on navigation of its waters to
148 Id. at 358-59 (emphasis added).
149 Id.
150 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, 163-64 (1986) (noting that Marshall's formulation ensures that "tenuous connections to granted powers will not pass muster" and discussing other limitations on
power stemming from his opinion); Barnett, supra note 142, at 214-15 (discussing Marshall's
post-McCulloch attempt to rebut claims that he had sanctioned unlimited federal power).
151 See Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2206-2209 (emphasizing the importance of Wickard v. Fil-

bum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
152 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
153 Gibbons v.Ogden, 22 U.S. (9Wheat.) 1 (1824); see Raich, 125 S.Ct. at2205.
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the entrepreneurs Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton and their
154
licensees.
The case is often cited as a decision justifying an extremely broad
interpretation of the commerce power. According to the Court's 1942
opinion in Wickard, "Chief Justice Marshall['s opinion in Gibbons] described the Federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded."' 55 The Wickard Court even claimed that, according to Gibbons,
"effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather
than from judicial processes."' 56 Similarly, Justice Souter's dissent in
Lopez refers to "the Court's recognition of a broad commerce power in
Gibbons v. Ogden,"' 57 and Justice Breyer's dissent in that case claims
that Gibbons endorsed congressional power to "regulate local activities
insofar as they significantly affect interstate commerce."' 5 8 Justice Souter' s dissenting opinion on behalf of four justices in Morrison cites Gib59
bons in similar terms.1
One reason why Gibbons is so often cited by advocates of a broad
interpretation of the commerce power may be their desire to dispel the
impression that their view is a modem creation of the New Deal era of
the 1930s and 40s. Citing Gibbons enables them to argue that Chief Justice Marshall, the leading early judicial interpreter of the Constitution,
adopted a broad view of the Commerce Clause "from the start"'160 of our
constitutional history.
It is certainly true that Gibbons famously defined commerce as "intercourse,"' 6 1 and emphasized that the commerce power extends to all
"commerce which concerns more states than one."' 162 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court also notes that the Commerce power is "plenary as to those objects" to which it extends. 6 3 At the same time
however, Marshall's Gibbons opinion interpreted the commerce power
much more narrowly than the post-New Deal cases do. For example,
Marshall recognized that "inspection laws," despite their obvious effect
on trade, do not fall within the scope of congressional commerce clause
authority:
154 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1-2.
155 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120.
156 Id.
157 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
158 id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 641 (2000) (Souter, J. dissenting) (quoting Wickard, 317
U.S. at 120, in describing Gibbons as a "seminal opinion" that "construed the commerce
power from the start
with 'a breadth never yet exceeded' ").
160 Id.
161 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189.
162 Id. at 194.
163 Id. at 197.
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That inspection laws may have a remote and considerable influence on commerce, will not be denied; but that a
power to regulate commerce is the source from which
the right to pass them is derived, cannot be admitted.
The object of inspection laws, is to improve the quality
of articles produced by the labour of a country; to fit
them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic use.
They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of
foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States,
and prepare it for that purpose. They form a portion of
that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every
thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to
the general government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection
laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description,
as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a
State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries,
&c., are component parts of this mass. 164
Thus, despite the fact that state inspection laws, quarantine laws,
and health laws have a "considerable influence on commerce," the federal government lacks the power to regulate them under the Commerce
Clause. 165 This statement of Marshall's is clearly at odds with the modem view that Congress can regulate even noncommercial activity so long
as it has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. To be sure, Marshall does suggest that Congress may in some instances be able to regulate state inspection laws when doing so is "clearly incidental to some
[congressional] power that is expressly given."' 166 But the requirement
that it be "clearly incidental" certainly does not suggest broad congressional authority to regulate any activity that has an impact on interstate
commerce.
2.

Wickard v. Filburn

Wickard v. Filburn is the precedent on which the Raich majority
relied most heavily. Justice Stevens' majority opinion states that Wickard
"is of particular relevance" and notes that "[t]he similarities between this
case and Wickard are striking." 167 Although Wickard is just one of sev164 Id. at 203. I am not aware of any modem scholarly discussion of this passage in
Gibbons. However, it is briefly cited and discussed in Justice Thomas' concurrence in Lopez
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 594 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas correctly points out that this passage
shows that the Gibbons Court "rejected the notion that Congress can regulate everything that
affects interstate commerce."
165 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203.
166 Id. at 204.
167 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2206.
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eral post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases that interpret congressional
power broadly, it is widely recognized as "perhaps the most far-reaching
68 If
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity."'
Wickard does not compel the outcome in Raich, it is likely that no other
precedent does either.
Wickard upheld the application of the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment
Act's restrictions on wheat production as applied to Roscoe Filburn, an
169
Ohio farmer who produced wheat for consumption on his own farm.
The Court noted that restriction of home-grown, home-consumed wheat
was a necessary component of Congress' scheme to "raise the market
price of wheat" because in the absence of regulation, home-grown wheat
could serve as a substitute for wheat sold in the market and depress de70
mand for the latter.'
There is no question that there are "striking" similarities between
Wickard and Raich. As Justice Stevens' Raich opinion points out:
Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating,
for home consumption a fungible commodity for which
there is an established interstate market. Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act was designed to control the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign
commerce... a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and demand of controlled substances in
...drug markets."17'
Furthermore, in both cases there is a possibility that the "homegrown"
172
commodity could be "drawn into" the interstate market.
However, there are also key differences between the two cases. First
and foremost, Wickard, involved the regulation of commercial activity to
a far greater extent than Raich. Roscoe Filburn actually sold "a portion of
[his wheat] crop" on the market and "fe[d] part to poultry and livestock
on the farm, some of which is sold."' 173 Filburn's wheat production was
quite clearly part of a commercial enterprise. 174 By contrast, Angel Raich
and Diane Monson grew marijuana solely for personal consumption for
medical purposes. 175 Under the Lopez-Morrison framework, the Wickard
168 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
169 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115, 121-27.
170 Id. at 127-29.
171 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2206-07.
172 Id. at 2207.
173 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 84.
174 For more details on Filbum and his farm, see Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy,52 EMORY
L.J. 1719 (2003); See also Jim Chen, Filburn'sForgotten Footnote - Of Farm Team Federalism and ItsFate, 82 MINN. L. REV. 249 (1997).
175 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200. Some of the cultivation of Raich's marijuana was provided
by "two caregivers," but these individuals provided their services "at no charge." Id.
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The Raich majority tries to counter this point by citing language in
Wickard indicating that Filburn's wheat growing would legitimately be
subject to regulation even though it "may not be regarded as commerce." 177 However, this passage in Wickard is very likely just dictum,
since the Court fully realized that Filburn was using his wheat for commercial purposes, including selling some of it on the market and feeding
much of the rest to "poultry and livestock" that he was raising for com1 78
mercial purposes.
Perhaps more importantly, however, Raich's analysis of Wickard
completely ignores the Court's earlier interpretation of Wickard in Lopez.
In that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion distinguished
Wickard on the ground that it "involved economic activity in a way that
possession of a gun in a school zone does not."' 179 Rehnquist emphasized
the importance of Filburn's commercial utilization of his wheat crop. 180
Unlike the Wickard language relied on by the Raich majority, Lopez's
gloss on Wickard is arguably a part of the holding. Without it, Rehnquist
could not have distinguished Wickard from Lopez itself and therefore
could not have reached the result he did without overruling Wickard.
A second relevant difference between Wickard and Raich is the
much greater evidence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce
available in the former. The government in Raich presented very little
proof that homegrown medical marijuana had a substantial effect on interstate markets.18 By contrast, the Wickard Court noted that "consumption of homegrown wheat . . .is the most variable factor" impacting
commercial wheat markets.' 82 Indeed, "[c]onsumption on the farm where
grown appears to vary in an amount greater than 20 per cent of average
production."' 8 3 It thus had a major impact on the price of wheat in interstate markets. This is much stronger evidence of "substantial effect" on
commerce than that presented in Raich.
Obviously, the Raich Court was free to overrule Lopez's interpretation of Wickard. But it should not have relied on Wickard as a controlling precedent that extends even to noneconomic activity, while ignoring
176 See discussion supra §I.B.
177 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2207 n.30 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125).
178 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 84.
179 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
180 Id. (noting that Filbum sold "a portion of his crop" and fed "part of it to poultry and
livestock").
181 See Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that "the Government

has made no showing in fact that the possession and use of homegrown marijuana for medical
purposes . . has a substantial effect on interstate commerce").
182 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127.
183 Id.
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Lopez's clear holding that Wickard should be read to apply only to "economic activity" such as that which Roscoe Filburn was himself engaged
in. Similarly, it should not have ignored the considerably greater evidence of substantial effect on interstate commerce available in Wickard
as compared to Raich. Although the Supreme Court could, if it chose to
do so, expand the applicability of Wickard to cover cases such as Raich,
it was not required to do so by any precedential considerations.
III.

MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE POLITICS
OF FEDERALISM

This section explains how the controversy over medical marijuana
exemplifies some of the major benefits of decentralized federalism, benefits that are undercut when the Court endorses untrammeled federal
power. Currently, there are eleven states that have legalized medical
84
marijuana.1
As I have explained elsewhere, 185 decentralized federalism has several major advantages, including responsiveness to diverse regional preferences and competition between state governments for citizens who can
"vote with their feet." Both of these are undermined in various ways by
the Court's decision in Raich. Obviously, decentralized federalism has
costs as well as benefits. But there is little reason to believe that such
costs are likely to be significant in the case of state laws permitting medical marijuana.
Although judicial enforcement of federalism in cases like Raich has
considerable appeal, it is likely that a full-blown judicial assault on all
exercises of the Commerce power that violate the constitutional text
would be both undesirable and doomed to failure. However, this observation need not and lead us to the opposite extreme of endorsing total
judicial abdication of the sort endorsed by Raich. Rather, courts should
proceed with a cautious regard for political realities, much as they do in
many other areas of constitutional law characterized by a middle ground
between maximalist judicial enforcement of the text and total abnegation.
Furthermore, a reasonably consistent approach to judicial enforcement of
federalism might enable the Court to build a cross-ideological constituency supporting this form of judicial review, much as has arisen in the
case of judicial review in a number of other fields.
184 For a complete listing and detailed description of state medical marijuana laws, see
http://www.medicalmarijuanaprocon.org/pop/StatePrograms.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2006)[hereinafter Medical Marijuana ProCon].
185 See John McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 89, 106-12 (2004); Ilya Somin, Closing
the Pandora'sBox of Federalism: The Case for JudicialRestriction of FederalSubsidies to
State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 464-65 (2002) [hereinafter Judicial Restriction].
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RAICH AND THE BENEFITS OF FEDERALISM

The Court's decision in Raich undercuts at least two major benefits

of federalism: responsiveness to diverse regional preferences and interstate competition for citizens "voting with their feet."
1. Responsiveness to diverse regionalpreferences
Public preferences on many issues diverge widely across state lines.
On many social and economic controversies, majority views in conservative "red states" understandably differ from those in liberal "blue states."
Where such regional differences in opinion exist, a system of decentralized federalism can satisfy a higher proportion of citizens than can a
unitary policy adopted by the federal government. Red staters can live
under conservative policies while their blue state neighbors can simulta18 6
neously enjoy liberal ones.
Ironically, the issue of medical marijuana does not fully conform to
the diversity model of federalism because support for medical marijuana
is so strong across the nation. Depending on question wording, a variety
of nationwide polls since 1995 have found support for legalized medical
marijuana ranging from 60 to 85 percent of respondents. 187 State-level
polls in twenty-six different states also find majority support for medical
marijuana, often by large margins. 188 In fact, I have not been able to find
a single state-level poll registering majority opposition to medical marijuana. Perhaps Raich should be criticized not for undermining federalism
and diversity but because, on the basis of deference to democracy, it
upholds a federal policy widely at variance with majority popular
opinion.

189

However, there is considerable variation in the size of the pro-medi0
cal marijuana majorities, ranging from 51.4% in a 2002 Nebraska poll, 19
19
1
to 81% in a 1999 Massachusetts survey.
Moreover, some of the
surveys measured support for medical marijuana use in a wider range of
circumstances than others. For example, some polls asked whether medical marijuana use should be allowed for "seriously" or "terminally" ill
186 For a more detailed discussion, see McGinnis & Somin, supra note 185, at 106-07;
Judicial Restriction, supra note 185, at 464-66.
187 See Medical Marijuana ProCon, supra note 184.
188 Id.
189 See generally Ilya Somin, PoliticalIgnorance and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty:
A New Perspective on the "Central Obsession" of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev.
1287 (2004) (arguing that judicial invalidation of legislation often does not have the countermajoritarian effects ascribed to it because much legislation does not actually express
majoritarian preferences or even runs counter to them) [hereinafter Political Ignorance].
190 See Medical Marijuana ProCon, supra note 184.
191 Id.
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patients, while others, such as a 2001 Minnesota poll, asked about legali92
zation of its use for all "medical purposes."'
For these reasons, there is likely to be considerable interstate variation not only in the degree of general public support for medical marijuana, but also in the range of circumstances in which majorities are
willing to permit its use. Decentralized federalism can satisfy these diverse preferences to a greater extent than the current federal policy under
which all medical marijuana use is banned throughout the nation. Moreover, as Justice O'Connor's dissent notes, allowing a diverse set of state
policies to flourish might create "room for experiment[ation]"' 9 3 that
could provide useful information about the impact of differing policies.
2.

Interstate competition, mobility, and "voting with your feet"

A second major advantage of decentralized federalism is the ability
of citizens dissatisfied with conditions in their jurisdiction to "vote with
their feet" by moving to a different area with more congenial public policies.1 9 4 "Foot voting" can stimulate competition for people and residents
by state governments anxious to attract new taxpayers or keep old ones
from fleeing. 1 95 Even poor and disadvantaged groups, such as Jim Crowera African-Americans, have often used "foot voting" to better their
lot. 196 Indeed, foot voting has important advantages over traditional "ballot box voting," including the ability to improve one's situation without
waiting for a favorable political majority to emerge in your state and the
presence of much stronger incentives for individuals to acquire accurate
information. 197
As yet, there is little evidence indicating that very many people are
likely to express their preferences for or against medical marijuana by
voting with their feet. After the passage of California's medical marijuana law in 1996, San Francisco pro-marijuana activists claimed that
"We've had people call and say they are moving to California because
this law has passed."1 98 Perhaps more significant is the fact that some
doctors believe that medical marijuana is often necessary to prevent severe pain. For example, "[Angel] Raich's physician believe[d] that forgoing cannabis treatment would certainly cause Raich excruciating pain
192 Id.
193 Raich, 125

S.Ct. at 2229.
194 For a more detailed analysis, see Somin, PoliticalIgnorance, supra note 189, at 1340-

51.
195 For analysis and citations to the literature, see Somin, Judicial Restriction, supra note
185, at 468-70.
196 Somin, PoliticalIgnorance, supra note 189, at 1346-47, 1350-51.
197

Id. at 1341-46.

198 Quoted in Mary Curtius, S.F. Eager to Implement New Pot Law, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26,

1996.
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and could very well prove fatal." 199 The prospect of avoiding great pain
or even death is certainly a powerful incentive to move to a state with
legalized medical marijuana. People have often voted with their feet to
achieve much smaller benefits. Over time, at least some significant number of people might have moved to California and the ten other states
that permit medical marijuana in order to avail themselves of its benefits.
That opportunity has now been largely foreclosed by Raich's endorsement of a nationwide ban on medical marijuana.
3.

The possibility of spillover effects

Despite its important benefits, decentralized federalism also has
costs. The one most relevant to the issues in Raich is the danger of "spillover effects," the possibility that states might enact policies that cause
harm in neighboring jurisdictions.2 0 0 In the present case, the danger is
that medical marijuana produced in one state might find its way into
illegal drug markets in neighboring states. It is this possibility that played
a key role in the Raich majority's reasoning, as well as in Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion. 20' However, as discussed above, the government
was unable to provide much evidence to support this contention.
A potentially important piece of evidence cutting the other way is
the absence of any amicus briefs by state governments supporting the
federal government's position in the case. Indeed, three states that ban
medical marijuana actually filed a brief supporting Raich on federalism
grounds. 20 2 These three state governments evidently concluded that an
increase in state autonomy more than outweighed any possible dangerous
spillovers. While we would not necessarily expect every state government that might support the CSA's ban on medical marijuana to file an
amicus brief, it is still striking that not even one chose to do so. In other
federalism cases, state officials have not hesitated to file briefs supporting federal power when they believed it was in their interest to do so. For
example, thirty-six states filed an amicus brief supporting the United
States position in Morrison.20 3 The failure of the United States to attract
even one supportive state amicus brief suggests that even those state officials who favor a ban on medical marijuana do not expect major spillover
effects to occur if some states pursue a policy of legalization.
199 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2200.
200 For a brief recent discussion of the literature on spillover effects, see Larry E. Ribstein

& Bruce Kobayashi, The Economics of Federalism 6 in, THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM 6
(eds. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce Kobayashi, forthcoming 2006).
201 See Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2207 (emphasizing danger of diversion of medical marijuana
into interstate markets); id. at 2214-16 (Scalia, J., concurring) (same).
202 Brief of the States of Alabama, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Ashcroft v. Raich, 124 S.Ct. 2909 (2004) (No. 03-14540, 2004 WL 2336486).
203 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 185, at 114.
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Even if some spillovers do arise, it is reasonable to expect that they
would be concentrated in states bordering on the legalizing jurisdictions
or otherwise in close proximity to them. In such cases, federal intervention may not be necessary to control spillovers because a small number
of neighboring states can address the issue through Coasean bargaining.
For example, if medical marijuana from state A inflicts a negative impact
on State B that inflicts more harm on B than A derives benefits, the
government of the latter can cut a deal with A to get it to change its
policies. 20 4 This standard application of the Coase Theorem 20 5 might
well be a superior solution to spillover effects than a categorical federal
ban forbidding medical marijuana across the board, even in states where
spillover effects are nonexistent or outweighed by the benefits of
legalization.
C.

FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL REALISM

Even those persuaded by the legal and political arguments against
Raich and in favor of judicial constraints on federal Commerce Clause
authority might hesitate to support aggressive judicial intervention in this
field because of the political obstacles.
After all, a comprehensive judicial attempt to enforce the text and
original meaning of the Commerce Clause might well lead to attempts to
invalidate large chunks of the modern administrative state, including
some popular civil rights and environmental laws. 20 6 Although such fears
may be exaggerated,2 0 7 they are nonetheless real. Even Justice Thomas,
the Supreme Court's strongest supporter of judicial review of federalism,
concedes that "[a]lthough I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to
undertake a fundamental examination of the past 60 years [of Commerce
204 See Thomas M. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J.
931, 981 (1997) (explaining how disputes over pollution spillover effects between small numbers of neighboring states can often be resolved through negotiation).
205 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
206 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, JudicialFederalismand the Future of FederalEnvironmental Regulation, 90 IowA L. REV. 379, 379-80 (2005) (compiling numerous examples of
statements by jurists and scholars expressing concern that judicial enforcement of federalism
could undermine environmental protection) [hereinafter Judicial Federalism];Jack M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045,
1053-57 (2001) (arguing that judicial enforcement of federalism could lead to a sweeping
rollback of civil rights laws).
207 See, e.g., Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 206, at 452-73 (arguing that even
rigorous judicial enforcement of federalism would leave intact considerable judicial power
over environmental issues, and that much of the remaining slack could be effectively dealt

with by state and local government);

DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM

(2005) (arguing that decentralization of environmental policy would have numerous benefits).
WASHINGTON
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Clause precedent]. Considerations of stare decisis and reliance interests
'20 8
may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean.
However, the dichotomy between a complete "return to the original
understanding" 20 9 (or to the text) and Raich-like judicial abdication is a
false choice. There are numerous intermediate options. The Court can
take many modest steps to limit congressional Commerce Clause power
without even approaching a complete return to the pre-New Deal era. It
may seem wrong or unprincipled for the Court to act on a constitutional
vision of limited federal power that it cannot - and probably would not
want to - fully realize. However, throughout its history, the Court has
often taken account of political constraints in determining how far to
push judicial doctrines. In the 1950s, for example, the Court refused to
order immediate desegregation of southern schools and avoided striking
down state bans on interracial marriage in large part because the justices
believed that embracing either step would spark a political backlash that
the Court could not overcome. 210 Yet such considerations did not mean
that the Court had to give up judicial review of segregation issues completely and judicial intervention in fact had a greater impact in this field
than some modern scholars are prepared to concede. 2 11
We should not expect judicial power to be able to overcome any and
all obstacles to achieving the "right" constitutional vision. If the judiciary
did have such absolute power, the Supreme Court justices really would
become the "judicial despots" of conservative campaign rhetoric, and
there is little reason to expect judicial despotism to be much better than
any other kind.
What the Supreme Court can reasonably be expected to do is
strengthen enforcement of constitutional principles at the margin, especially in areas where judges have a "comparative advantage" over the
perverse incentives of other political actors in Congress and the executive branch. Federalism may well be such a field because Congress and
the president have strong incentives to overextend their powers and the
electorate often lacks the vigilance and knowledge necessary to punish
such efforts at federal self-aggrandizement. 2 12 While the incentives faced
by judges on federalism issues are by no means perfect, they are compar208 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 n.8.
209 Id.
210 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTs: THE SUPREME COURT

312-22 (2004).
211 See generally David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, JudicialPower and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE L.J. 591 (2004) (presenting evidence that early twentieth century judicial review sometimes helped promote civil rights for African-Americans even in cases where
powerful political forces cut against such efforts).
212 For a detailed argument along these lines, see McGinnis & Somin, supra note 185, at
93-112.
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
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atively better or at least less perverse than those of the other branches of
21 3
government.
These considerations do not, of course, provide a detailed plan for
exactly how far the Supreme Court should go in enforcing limits on the
Commerce Clause. Any such outline would require far more extensive
analysis than I have presented here. The present Article is limited to defending the more modest conclusion that the Court should not have endorsed the almost complete abdication represented by Raich.

D.

RAICH, FEDERALISM, AND THE POLITICAL LEFT

One possible political opening for future judicial review of federalism is the reawakening of interest in constraining federal power on the
political left. Raich is one of a series of recent cases in which the Bush
Administration and its conservative Republican allies have made aggressive use of federal power in pursuing conservative policy goals. Other
recent examples include the 2003 federal partial birth abortion ban, 21 4 the
No Child Left Behind Act education bill, 21 5 the campaign for a federal
ban on gay marriage, 21 6 and congressional intervention in the Terri Schiavo case. 2 17 The battle over assisted suicide that culminated in Gonzales
v. Oregon is yet another example of the administration attempting to use
federal power to curb liberal policies at the state level. In each of these
cases, political liberals have found themselves in the unaccustomed position of defending state autonomy against interference by a conservative
federal government.
As a result, some liberal scholars and political commentators have
begun to believe that at least some judicial review of federalism may be
justified. Writing in the left-wing journal Dissent, Harvard Law Professor David Barron recently urged that "[a] progressive federalism might
...

embrace the Rehnquist Court's limited view of Congress' Commerce

Clause power. Congress would retain its ability to regulate economic activity. It would not, however, possess a general power to regulate any
213 Id.at 127-30.

214 See Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on
Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 408-12 (2002) (noting conservative
support for a federal ban on partial birth abortions, despite its incongruity with conservative
views on limited federal power).
215 See Sam Dillon, President's Initiative to Shake up Education is Facing Protests in
Many State Capitols, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at 12 (noting liberal Democratic criticisms of
the Act for excessive intrusion on state autonomy in education policy).
216 See Steve Chapman, Losing their Faith in Federalism:As the Gay Marriage Debate
Shows, ConservativesAre No Longer Champions of Federalism,NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, July

26, 2004, at 15 (noting that both liberals and conservatives have reversed their usual positions
on federalism in the context of the battle over gay marriage).
217 Marcia Coyle, Life after 'Schiavo', NAT'L L.J., Mar. 28, 2005, at 10.
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matter chosen by a majority of its members. '21 8 Barron argues that liberal "faith in unlimited national authority was the contingent product of
liberal control of national institutions. ' 2 19 Now that "circumstances have
changed," liberals must "look at the Constitution's federalism with fresh
eyes."'220 A similar argument has been advanced by liberal political com22
mentator Franklin Foer. 1
Other left-leaning scholars and activists have advocated the use of
federalism doctrine to protect gay rights (which have achieved greater
political success at the state and local level, but are opposed by conservatives in Washington), 22 2 and to block federal legislation restricting abortion and assisted suicide. 223 It is also significant that two recent lower
court decisions, including the Ninth Circuit ruling in Raich, striking
down federal legislation on Commerce Clause grounds have been authored by liberal court of appeals judges. 224 Ironically, the Bush Administration's aggressive use of federal power, coupled with the political
decline of the Democratic Party from its post-New Deal peak, have accomplished a change in liberal attitudes towards federal power that conservative and libertarian academics were never able to achieve through
intellectual argument.
At least for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that the federal government will again be consistently dominated by liberal Democrats. Even
if the Democratic Party does retake the Congress or the presidency, their
victory is unlikely to be overwhelming or permanent. Moreover, there
will still be numerous liberal causes, such as gay marriage, that have a
greater chance of success at the state level than in Washington.
These circumstances create the potential for an alliance between
conservative and libertarian supporters of judicial federalism on the one
hand and liberal ones on the other. Although the three groups will continue to disagree on the exact contours of judicial review of federalism
issues, they may be able to find common ground on the conclusion that
Commerce Clause authority is subject to judicial review and that Congress does "not possess a general power to regulate any matter chosen by
a majority of its members. '22 5 If Commerce Clause review is applied
218 David J. Barron, Reclaiming Federalism, DISSENT 64, 68 (2005).
219 Id.

Id.
221 Franklin Foer, The Joys of Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005.
222 See, e.g., Stephen Clark, ProgressiveFederalism?A Gay LiberationistPerspective, 66
ALB. L. REV. 719 (2003) (arguing that judicial enforcement of federalism can promote gay
rights).
223 See Law, supra note 214, at 409-17.
224 See, e.g., Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (partially invalidating federal statute forbidding possession of pornography).
225 Barron, supra note 218, at 68.
220
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consistently enough to strike down both conservative and liberal statutes
that go beyond the limits set by the courts, both right and left-wing jurists
will have some reason to support judicial review in this area.
Obviously, it is unlikely that the four current liberal justices will
change their minds about the Commerce Clause. They have committed
themselves too openly and strongly in cases such as Lopez, Morrison,
and Raich. However, given their ages (85 in the case of Justice Stevens),
it is unlikely that these particular justices will continue to dominate the
liberal wing of the Court for very long. Looking to the future, it is possible that a new generation of liberal and conservative/libertarian jurists
can find at least some degree of common ground in this field. Just as
judicial conservatives eventually accepted the liberal innovations of
strong judicial review in the fields of free speech and criminal procedure,
even as they continue to disagree with liberals as to the exact contours of
doctrine in these areas, so too liberals may come to accept the "conservative" position that the judiciary has a legitimate role to play in constraining federal power - even as they continue to disagree with the
conservative view of how that role should be exercised.
One of the lessons of Raich is that judicial review of federalism is
unlikely to survive and prosper without at least some acceptance from
liberals. Without such support on the left, it is likely to collapse in any
case where the conservative bloc on the Court is internally divided, as it
was in Raich itself.226 In the long run, however, Raich could help revive
judicial review of federalism if it strengthens the growing sense among
some liberals that unlimited federal power is no longer in their interest.
IV.

THE PROHIBITION PARALLEL

Almost completely ignored in the debate over Raich is the fact that
the decision was closely paralleled by judicial developments during the
Prohibition era of the 1920s. The Prohibition precedent reinforces several
of the conclusions advanced in this Article, including the claim that the
Commerce Clause does not give Congress unlimited authority over all
activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce, the tendency of
limited federal power to undermine the benefits of federalism, and the
possibility that liberal causes can benefit from judicial constraints on
congressional power as much as conservative ones.
Ratified in 1920, the Eighteenth Amendment forbade "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors ...

poses.

' 227

for beverage pur-

Section 2 of the Amendment gave Congress the power to

226 See Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist
Court, 9 LEWIs & CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005) (analyzing divisions over federalism among
different types of judicial conservatives).
227 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVIII, § 1.
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"enforce this article by appropriate legislation. '22 8 The fact that a constitutional amendment was considered necessary to give Congress the
power to ban the "manufacture" and "sale" of alcoholic beverages provides additional proof that the Commerce Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause did not give Congress the power to regulate all activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce. 229 After all, early twentieth
century jurists surely recognized that the manufacture and sale of alcohol
products had a substantial impact on interstate trade. Nonetheless, the
Eighteenth Amendment was enacted in large part precisely because
mainstream legal opinion at the time recognized that Congress lacked the
authority to ban the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages under
230
its Article I powers.
Like the enactment of the CSA in 1968, the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment and associated enforcement legislation led to an enormous expansion in federal criminal law. From 1970 to 1994, the
proportion of federal prisoners incarcerated for drug offenses increased
from 16.3% to a high of 61.3%, before dropping to 54.1% in 2004.231
Similarly, the advent of Prohibition more than doubled the federal prison
population from 5000 in 1920 to some 12,000 in 1930.232
As with Raich, Prohibition significantly undermined state responsiveness to regionally diverse policy preferences. "Wet" states with
populations supportive of alcohol consumption were forced to conform
to the national regime imposed by prohibitionist "drys. ' 233 Obviously,
this result also reduced the ability of "wets" to vote with their feet and
move away from dry jurisdictions to more congenial areas.
In perhaps the most striking parallel of all, Congress used Section
Two of the Amendment to enact broad enforcement legislation that eventually led to two Supreme Court decisions that became close Prohibition
analogues to Raich. Although the Eighteenth Amendment only banned
234
the manufacture and sale of alcohol used for "beverage purposes,"

Congress soon enacted the National Prohibition Act of 1921, which forbade anyone to "manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating liquor" except as authorized by
2 35
a narrow range of exceptions included in the Act.
228 Id. at § 2.
229 See supra Part II.
230 See RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE 18TH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLrrY, 1880-1920 chs. 6-7 (1995) (tracing the constitutional debate over prohibition in the Progressive Era).
231 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003

519 tbl. 6.57 (2004).
232 HAMM, supra note 230, at 267.
233 Id. at 261-66.
234 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.

235 Quoted in James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 554 (1924).
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In the 1924 case of James Everard'sBreweries v. Day, the Supreme
Court upheld the Prohibition Act's ban on manufacturing and possession
as applied to two breweries that sought to sell alcoholic drinks for "medicinal purposes." 236 In reasoning strikingly similar to that of Raich, the
Court upheld the ban on the ground that it was "appropriate legislation"
under Section Two of the Amendment because "[t]he opportunity to
manufacture, sell, and prescribe intoxicating malt liquors for 'medicinal
purposes' opens many doors to clandestine traffic in them as beverages
under the guise of medicines ...

and thereby ...

hampers and obstructs

'237

enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment.
Like the Raich Court,
the Prohibition-era Court justified a ban on possession of a proscribed
substance for medical purposes on the theory that otherwise the stock
might find its way into the market for recreational use. 2 38 And it did so
239
in a way that gave broad deference to Congress.
In another close analogue to Raich, a 1926 Supreme Court opinion
authored by Justice Louis Brandeis upheld a provision of the National
Prohibition Act that forbade physicians to prescribe more than one pint
of alcohol per patient for "any period of ten days" and also required that
"no prescription [for alcohol] shall be filled more than once. '2 40 In a 5-4
decision, the Court upheld the statute against challenge, relying primarily
on the Everard's precedent. 24 1 In a forceful dissent that echoes Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Raich, Justice Sutherland criticized the majority
decision on the grounds that the Prohibition Act's "limitation on quan242
tity" was "unsupported by any legislative finding that it is reasonable.
Sutherland also claimed that the majority opinion undermines
243
federalism.
Obviously, there is an important difference between the Prohibition
Era cases and Raich in so far as the former only applied to congressional
efforts to regulate alcohol, while the latter applies to the much broader
range of legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause. Nonetheless,
there are also important similarities that demonstrate how a broad federal
prohibition regime cannot easily be sustained without stretching federal
power to the limit and undercutting judicial constraints on congressional
authority. Conservatives who support both judicial review of Commerce
Clause power and an untrammeled federal War on Drugs may have to
choose between these two goals, as it may not be possible to pursue both
236 Id. at 556
237 Id. at 561.

238 Compare Everard's, 265 U.S. at 561, with Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2207.
239 See Everard's, 265 U.S. at 560.
240 Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 587 (1926).
241 Id. at 593-96.
242 Id. at 603-06 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 604-06.
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simultaneously. And, as with Raich, the Prohibition era cases drive home
the point that unconstrained federal power can be used to undercut liberal
policies no less than conservative ones.
CONCLUSION
From a doctrinal point of view, Gonzales v. Raich seems to all but
eliminate the prospect of meaningful judicial restriction of congressional
Commerce Clause authority. This result also has the effect of undercutting some of the major political benefits of decentralized federalism. Yet
Raich also helps underscore the extent to which unlimited federal power
no longer serves the interests of political liberals who for so long were
the strongest supporters of unfettered congressional authority.
The Court may not find it difficult to get around Raich should a new
cross-ideological judicial coalition emerge to rescue judicial review of
federalism. Just as Raich exploited the ambiguities of Lopez and Morrison to gut these precedents while purporting to work within the framework they established, 244 a future Supreme Court can exploit Raich's lip
service to the Lopez-Morrison approach in order to undermine Raich itself. Such a Court could defuse Raich's impact by adopting a narrower
definition of "economic activity," 24 5 restoring the word "essential" to the
broader regulatory scheme exception, 24 6 and returning to Lopez and Morrison's benign neglect of the "rational basis" test. 247 While such steps
would surely be inconsistent with the doctrinal letter of Raich, they could
probably restore judicial review of Commerce Clause cases without
overruling Raich in its entirety.
In the long run, the future of judicial federalism depends less on the
precise reasoning of any one decision than on the answer to the question
of whether it will continue to be a parochial concern of conservatives and
libertarians. For the moment, judicial review of the Commerce Clause
has become a casualty of the War on Drugs. It remains to be seen
whether the wound is fatal or the precursor to a miraculous recovery
fueled by support from unexpected liberal quarters. If judicial federalism
is ever to escape the oblivion of Raich, it may be through a recognition
that constraints on federal power have benefits that are not limited to one
side of the political spectrum.
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